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Abstract
This article offers an overview of Francoist repression in the Catalan Countries from the outbreak of the Civil War to the 
first decade after the establishment of the dictatorship. It covers both physical violence and measures such as economic 
repression, imprisonment, professional purges and the social and moral control to which the population as a whole was 
subjected. First the type of violence and domination exercised by the insurgents in the territories occupied is briefly ex-
amined. Then the author offers an account of the events: she commences in the summer of 1936 in Majorca, the only 
Catalan-speaking territory to remain in rebel hands, then proceeds to the Lleida region, which was occupied in the spring 
of 1938, and concludes with the final offensive against Catalonia and Valencia, launched in the winter of that same year. 
Special stress is laid on the repercussions of the 1939 Law of Political Responsibilities and the meaning attached by the 
occupiers to the pacification and reconstruction of the conquered territories. 
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The widespread attention paid in recent years to the de-
bate over the memory of the Civil War, the Franco dicta-
torship, and the treatment given to victims of the hostili-
ties and the repression is a sign, above all, that the difficulty 
of reconciling individual and collective memories still sub-
sists.1 The controversy, far from being specific to our own 
country, is reminiscent of the experiences of other coun-
tries, such as Germany, Italy and Russia, that suffered dic-
tatorial regimes of their own at some time during the crisis 
that affected Europe in the first half of the 20th century. 
Another good example is provided by the ‘paths of memo-
ry’ followed by Latin American countries which have 
emerged from military dictatorships imposed during the 
second half of the century. Everywhere it has been neces-
sary to draw the slender dividing line between historical 
and critical knowledge of the past, on the one hand, and 
diverse memories of that past on the other. 
In Catalonia the Fundació Pi i Sunyer, to mention one 
nearby example, invited several historians and jurists to a 
symposium in June 2007 on “Violence and justice in 
Catalonia between 1936 and 1975”. The aim was to stim-
ulate reflection on the meaning of the different forms of 
violence and repression and the legal and administrative 
* Corresponding author: Conxita Mir i Curcó. Facultat de Lletres. Campus 
del Rectorat. Pl. Víctor Siurana, 1. 25003 Lleida, Catalonia, EU. Tel. +34 973 
702147. Fax: +34 973702050. E-mail: cmir@historia.udl.cat
procedures recorded all over Catalonia between the out-
break of the Civil War and the end of dictatorship. As a 
result, certain brief conclusions − always based on the 
more intensive and rigorous historical research under-
taken from the 1980s onwards − were made public. The 
idea was to influence the debate on the topic, a debate 
not devoid of biased, self-interested interpretations, 
which frequently ignore the fact that all these forms of 
violence arose out of the military insurrection of July 
1936.2 
Violence and Domination
The victory of the democratic Left in the election held in 
February 1936, at a time when the rising tide of Fascism in 
its various forms was reaching its climax, confirmed civil 
society’s preference for a progressive Republic. A few 
months later, part of the army rose against the Republic. 
Furthermore, in those places where the coup failed − as 
occurred in the greater part of the Catalan Countries − a 
parallel revolutionary movement broke out which, in the 
early stages, the Republican authorities were unable to 
control. These spontaneous outbreaks of violence initially 
received a boost from repressive acts committed by mili-
tants from various groups and political organizations act-
ing under instructions that can in no way be attributed to 
the Republican government.3 Once the government had 
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the door was open to the proliferation of special jurisdic-
tions, which efficiently backed up the emergency applica-
tion of summary justice. The proceedings of courts such 
as the Tribunales de Responsabilidades Políticas (Political 
Responsibilities Tribunals), the various commissions set 
up to purge the administration, and the provincial au-
thorities in charge of maintaining public order, are our 
best sources of information as to the meaning of the Fran-
coist legal system, which afforded protection to the re-
pressive measures that were systematically applied imme-
diately after the July 1936 rising.6
Summer 1936: The Triumph of the Coup in 
Majorca
On 18 July 1936, the island of Majorca was the only Cata-
lan-speaking area to fall into rebel hands. Despite the lack 
of culprits who could be accused of violent opposition to 
the coup, the plan of repression implemented from the 
very first days precisely matched what the rebels had de-
fined in advance as urgent ‘surgical’ extermination. The 
title of a book on the history of the Civil War in the village 
of Porreres − Desfilades de dia, afusellaments de nit (Pa-
rades during the day, shootings at night) − accurately re-
flects how the routine violence that got underway after 
the victory of the military coup on the island was turned 
into a daily spectacle.7
recovered from the surprise, it not only publicly con-
demned the extremism but attempted to halt it and helped 
those persecuted by the revolutionaries to escape or go 
into exile. 
In contrast, the violence perpetrated by the insurgents 
at the same period was conceived as a tool for destroying 
parliamentary democracy, a prior step towards the impo-
sition of a new social order. Those who had risen against 
the Republic followed the lead of Europe’s growing Fas-
cist movement by internalizing the Civil War as a cam-
paign to defend western civilization against Soviet bar-
barity. This campaign was based on the defence of order, 
religion and social harmony, values which had supposed-
ly been endangered by the Republicans, or ‘Reds’, as they 
were generically termed. The rebels’ corpus of doctrine 
exalted the use of force and violence. Consequently it was 
the all-powerful army which took charge of the chastise-
ment of society, an operation baptized by the Church as a 
‘crusade’. Those who had rebelled against the legally con-
stituted Republic considered they had been called upon to 
carry out a historical mission that did not need the legiti-
mating support of society.4 
Thus they set out to destroy the legitimate government 
and the structures that upheld it through the perpetual 
use of ‘war-time decrees’ and to demobilize and subdue 
the population by subjecting them to fear and terror.5 
From the legal point of view, once a state of war had been 
declared and the primacy of military power was ratified, 
Figure 1. Remains of the barricades erected at the intersection of Carrer Cavallers and Carrer Major when General Franco’s troops entered 
the city of Lleida. Porta collection - University of Lleida.
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victors occupied a stretch of territory running north to 
south along the Noguera Pallaresa and Segre rivers. For 
nine months the new front along the banks of these two 
rivers held. The only weak points were the bridgeheads at 
Seròs (Segrià), Balaguer and Baronia de Sant Oïsme 
(Noguera), and Tremp (Pallars Jussà). In all these strate-
gic areas, fierce fighting took place and the Republican 
army failed to force the occupiers to retreat. 
At the Balaguer bridgehead, attempts by the Republi-
cans to recapture positions such as Déu hill − nicknamed 
El Merengue (The Meringue) − caused hundreds of casu-
alties. Today the spot has been restored as a memorial site 
at the instigation of veterans of the contingent due for 
call-up in 1941, which received particularly severe pun-
ishment on this front. These soldiers, who were mobilized 
at the tender age of eighteen (seventeen in some cases), 
have been remembered, year after year, by the Associació 
d’Excombatents de la Quinta del Biberó (Association of 
ex-combatants of the ‘baby-bottle contingent’). The name 
comes from an expression coined by Frederica Montseny, 
then Minister of Health, moved at the sight of these youths 
− barely more than adolescents − who had been sent to 
fight after just a few days’ military training.10 
Soon the consequences of political repression were 
added to the numerous military casualties on the Segre 
front. In the Lleida region − unlike Majorca −, by the time 
Franco’s troops arrived many of those with political links 
to the Republic had retreated to the rearguard, while many 
of those involved in rearguard revolutionary violence had 
fled. This, however, did nothing to abate the fury of the 
occupiers, which was vented upon a defenceless, exhaust-
ed population, living in a backward region that had been 
further impoverished by the proximity of the front. 
As soon as the troops arrived, arbitrary, systematic vio-
lence got underway. Military courts started operation im-
mediately. José María Fontana, a Falangist from Tarrago-
na, bore witness in his memoirs to the consequences of 
the arrival of Franco’s troops in Lleida: the occupation of 
Catalonia, he maintained, took place in a fairly level-
headed manner, except for what he describes as “the 
blemish” of Lleida. The euphemism recalls the cost of the 
occupation, in human terms, which still cannot be accu-
rately assessed today. Various studies by historians such 
as Josep Mª Solé, Joan Vilarroya, Manel Gimeno, and later 
Mercè Barallat and Joan Sagués, report that repression in 
the Lleida region was indiscriminate and resolute, and 
was carried out by the military authorities in cooperation 
with the Falangists and local right-wingers. Dozens of 
non-combatants were executed merely on the grounds 
that they were perceived as sympathetic towards the Re-
publican cause. 
Certain extremely violent acts were perpetrated against 
women from the Pallarès region. These are documented 
by the historian Manel Gimeno and are highly reminiscent 
of the fate of five nurses from Bayo’s expedition to Major-
ca, who were captured, brutally raped, and finally shot. 
The latter episode is better known than those in the moun-
Catalonia, Valencia and Minorca remained on the Re-
publican side, but in Majorca hundreds of arbitrary exe-
cutions took place, while many other people were tried 
and had their property confiscated, and still others fin-
ished up in prisons and concentration camps scattered 
round the island. 
Josep Massot gives us the most vivid account of the sit-
uation. He tells how Alberto Bayo, a lieutenant colonel in 
the Air Force, tried to win back the Balearics for the Re-
public in August 1936 – not just Majorca, but Eivissa, 
Formentera and Cabrera as well, where the rebellion had 
initially been victorious – and relates the sinister wave of 
repression that was unleashed in response to his landing. 
This reaction can hardly be described as ‘uncontrolled vi-
olence’ since it involved seeking out the leaders of left-
wing parties and labour organizations, along with teach-
ers, journalists, professional people and Free Masons, 
who were unable to leave the island. Some civilians did 
take part, however, at the head of secret bands of exalted 
right-wingers − most, but not all of them Falangists − and 
it was they who identified the persons to be eliminated. 
These even included Republicans who had originally been 
released for lack of charges.8 
According to eye-witnesses accounts, two days after 
the military rising some 1,500 suspects had been impris-
oned. It is difficult to estimate how many deaths were im-
putable to the repression that took place between the 
summer of 1936 and the first quarter of 1937 − the date of 
the arrival of the Italians headed by ‘Count Rossi’ − be-
cause many of the victims were from elsewhere or had no 
relatives. Not long after the events, Georges Bernanos, in 
Les Grands Cimetières sous la lune (Paris, 1938), referred 
to 3,000 dead. Some later considered this an exaggeration, 
while others believed it fell short of the truth. Current es-
timates range from a minimum of 1,000 − the number of 
fully documented executions − to a maximum of 2,000. 
Only a few hundred were tried by a military court before 
being killed.9
David Ginard has no hesitation in describing the Bal-
earic archipelago, which had only 300,000 inhabitants, as 
one of the most severely punished areas in the Catalan 
Countries or in Spain. It was here, in his view, that the 
rebels, by the way they dealt with the popular classes of 
democratic and left-wing ideology, revealed their deter-
mination to stamp out any possible upsurge of protest. 
Neither fear of Bayo’s militia force which was trying to 
reconquer lost territory, nor the island’s strategic situa-
tion or social structure can account for the ruthlessness of 
their acts. The only explanation for the reprisals that were 
carried out immediately wherever the coup was success-
ful is to be found in the underlying logic of terror. 
Spring 1938: Lleida and the Segre front
When the Aragon front collapsed in the spring of 1938, 
part of the region around Lleida fell into rebel hands. The 
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tains of Lleida, possibly because at the time it aroused con-
troversy even among the regime’s supporters, some of 
whom tried to exculpate their fellow Francoists on the 
grounds that Republican women deserved little respect.11
In any event, the number of extrajudicial deaths re-
corded in Majorca and the Lleida region was extremely 
large, as is pointed out in the chief summary on the topic 
to appear to date: Víctimas de la guerra civil (Temas de 
Hoy, 1999), edited by Santos Julià. Even so, the figures 
quoted in the book for the total number of victims caused 
by repression in each province are constantly being up-
dated. In Lleida, for instance, the historian Mercè Barallat 
puts the number of persons executed under sentence from 
a military court at 558, rather than 450 as stated by Solé 
Sabaté. She also provides evidence of the shooting of 148 
Republicans who were never tried by a war tribunal and 
the deaths of 169 political prisoners, and estimates that 
hundreds of undocumented deaths occurred, presumably 
as the result of uncontrolled violence during the initial 
phase of the occupation, when the cemetery was on the 
Republican side of the front that divided the city in two.12
If similar variations are found elsewhere, as several lo-
cal studies containing detailed statistics indicate, the total 
of 3,385 victims of Francoist repression in Catalonia, 
which was established nearly twenty years ago and re-
ferred to by Francesc Vilanova as the “numerical canon”, 
must of necessity be revised in an upward direction. 
Figure 2. The streets of Lleida when General Franco’s troops entered the city. Collection of the Biblioteca Nacional.
Figure 3. Ceremony in front of La Paeria (Lleida City Hall) in Llei-
da in memory of the dead of one of the opposing sides in the Civil 
War. Archive of the Ateneu Popular de Ponent.
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number of deaths that can be laid down to Francoist re-
pression in the Catalan Countries to between 10,000 and 
11,000. In other words, the bloodiest of all forms of vio-
lence affected 2.34 of every thousand inhabitants.13
The end of the war was especially dramatic in the Va-
lencian Country, where the sea constituted an insuperable 
barrier. The thousands of people captured there finished 
up in jail or in one of at least thirteen concentration camps 
which were set up. The unusual features of the repression 
recorded in the region can best be explained by these large 
masses of people. Summary executions, ordered as a mat-
ter of urgency, were carried out in the cemeteries of many 
small localities. As Vicent Gavarda perspicaciously re-
marks, they were part of the practice known as sacas ejem-
plares, i.e. the ‘exemplary removal’ of prisoners from the 
camps to take part in ‘identity parades’ in their localities 
of origin before being publicly shot. Some mass graves in 
the Valencian Country, like those in Catalonia, were ‘dig-
nified’ in the early 1980s. Among them was the one in Pa-
terna cemetery, where over two thousands executions 
were carried out. The same did not occur in the cemetery 
of the city of Valencia, where a mass grave containing the 
bodies of victims of Francoist reprisals remained un-
marked and badly neglected until very recently. The spot, 
moreover, is now in danger of disappearing altogether as 
a result of the City Council’s plan to redevelop the area. 
This same plan, however, also conferred symbolic status 
on to the spot in the spring of 2006 and sparked off the 
various protests that have been staged in the autonomous 
community of Valencia ever since in support of the re-
covery of memory and the right to remembrance.14
In Catalonia half the executions carried out by the 
Franco regime took place in 1939. Some 1,000 people 
were put to death in the period from May to July, an aver-
age of 10 per day. Though high, this figure falls far short 
of the one quoted at the time by Count Ciano, Mussolini’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who claimed that 150 execu-
tions a day were taking place in Barcelona in July.15 Nor 
should these data lead us to overlook the fact that it was 
the Catalan countryside that suffered most acutely from 
the repression. In Valencia the repression was most se-
vere in northern regions such as Camp del Túria, Baix 
Maestrat, Safor, Vall d’Albaida, Ribera Alta and Ribera 
Baixa, where the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo 
(National Confederation of Labour − CNT) was present 
and therefore experiments in collectivization had been 
conducted. Moreover the harshest phase of the repres-
sion, which lasted from the end of the war to 1942 or 1943 
elsewhere, continued well into the 1950s in Valencia, un-
til the Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party 
of Spain − PCE) called a halt in 1951 to the intensive guer-
rilla activity that had been taking place in the area. 
The Agrupación Guerrillera de Levante (Guerrilla 
Group of Eastern Spain − AGLA) was a well-established 
force deployed in the mountainous zone that straddles 
the provinces of Teruel, Cuenca, Valencia and Castelló. 
In 1947, as Fernanda Romeu recounted some years ago, it 
Winter 1938: the Start of the Offensive 
against the rest of Catalonia and the 
Valencian Country 
At the end of 1938, the front established the previous 
spring in the provinces of Lleida and Castelló was broken 
and the occupation of Catalonia and the Valencian Coun-
try got underway. By early February 1939, Franco’s troops 
had reached the French border. The city of Valencia was 
not to fall until March. During the last weeks before the 
final defeat, some 15,000 refugees gathered at the port of 
Alacant to be evacuated. Many were leading Republicans, 
who were trapped there waiting for ships that were never 
able to drop anchor. They suffered the same fate as the 
rest of the multitude who were taken prisoner when the 
ports were closed.
Some highly arbitrary acts were again recorded in this 
final phase of the war, notably in the southern regions be-
longing to the provinces of Tarragona and Lleida, such as 
Conca de Barberà, Terra Alta and Les Garrigues. As the 
historian Josep Termes underlines in his last work, Misè-
ria contra pobresa. Els fets de la Fatarella de gener de 1937 
(Afers, 2005), these were poor regions where the outbreak 
of the Civil War had triggered social conflicts that had 
been brewing for years. Despite this, military tribunals 
were set up in the regional capitals and certain smaller lo-
calities near the front and soon began operation. Later on 
it was at the military courts (Auditorías de Guerra) in the 
provincial capitals that the accused, many of them villag-
ers, were sentenced and, if found guilty, executed. 
In Barcelona, over 1,600 executions took place in the 
open air at the Camp de la Bota in the Poble Nou district, 
an area that was totally transformed by the building of the 
site for the 2004 Forum of Cultures. Elsewhere in Catalo-
nia people were usually shot against cemetery walls. Con-
sequently the largest mass graves, containing the bodies 
of dozens of executed Republicans, are to be found in 
graveyards. Some 500 people were buried in each of the 
mass graves in the cemeteries of Tarragona and Lleida. 
From the mid-1940s onwards, at least in Lleida, a few 
families were give permission to erect crosses. These were 
nearly always made of wood and could only bear the name 
of the person they wanted to remember and the date of 
death. As time went by, further expressions of mourning 
took place and latterly the number has increased. The 
families of those executed − those who had descendants 
− have never stopped visiting the graves. Many, however, 
are still awaiting the official ‘dignification’ of these spaces 
of memory. What they want is neither more nor less than 
what was done in the 1980s at the Fossar de la Pedrera in 
Montjuïc cemetery − an abandoned quarry where most of 
the Republicans shot in Barcelona were secretly buried − 
where the remains of the Catalan President Lluís Com-
panys, executed at the fortress of Montjuïc in 1940, were 
transferred on 15 October 1985. 
According to Vicent Gavarda, close to 5,000 people 
were executed in Valencia. This would bring the total 
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were killed and 648 were wounded in the bombardment 
of Alacant between November 1936 and December 1938. 
In the city of Valencia, 825 people are believed to have 
been killed in bombing raids during the same period. 
Close to 3,000 are thought to have been wounded in the 
bombing of the ports of Gandia, Borriana, Sagunt and 
Dénia, an operation which – as Ismael Saz observes in 
Història del país Valencià, corresponent a l’Època Contem-
porània (Edicions 62, 1990) − was motivated, not only by 
military factors, but economic and psychological consid-
erations as well. Approximately 10,000 Valencians are be-
lieved to have gone into permanent exile. The losses in the 
Catalan Countries as a whole were on such a scale as to be 
irreparable, as they were throughout Spain: out of a total 
population of 23,677,095, according to the 1930 census, 
between 500,000 and 600,000 lost their lives as a result of 
the war or its aftermath.
Emergency summary justice was the foremost tool of 
repression. Countless Republicans were tried by war tri-
bunals. They were charged − paradoxically, as has so often 
been pointed out − with armed rebellion. In 2003, the 
President of the present-day military court with jurisdic-
tion over Catalonia, Aragon, the Balearic Islands and Nav-
arre − the Tribunal Militar Territorial Tercer − set up a 
committee composed of representatives of the Spanish 
Ministry of Defence and the Catalan autonomous govern-
ment, the Generalitat. Its mandate was to catalogue the 
records of the proceedings initiated in Catalonia between 
1939 and 1988 currently in the possession of the tribunal, 
which has headquarters at the Gobierno Militar (seat of 
the Military Governor) in Barcelona. A first data base, for 
localization purposes, was created out of individual 
records. It contains approximately 110,000 prosecutions 
involving some 146,000 persons, since the charges were 
often against several accused. These are the figures availa-
ble so far, and they also reveal that over half the trials took 
place during the early decades of the dictatorship. In the 
Valencian Country it is calculated that approximately 
8,000 prosecutions were brought by war tribunals in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. Many, as usually hap-
pened, were against several people and thus the number of 
persons charged is higher. Other partial data tell us, for in-
stance, that more than 5,000 people were tried by war tri-
bunal in Tarragona. In terms of the 1936 census, this 
means that 15.2‰ of the population were affected.18
The number of death sentences passed after the war 
ended was enormous: 50,000 executions were added to 
the 100,000 that had taken place all over Spain during the 
hostilities. In 1939 and 1940, a total of 300,000 prison sen-
tences were also pronounced, and between 370,000 and 
500,000 people were interned in one or other of the con-
centration camps set up under the provisions laid down 
in the spring of 1937 at the Generalísimo’s headquarters. 
As many as sixteen camps seem to have been in operation 
in Catalonia until 1942, in cities including Barcelona, 
Reus, Figueres, Lleida and Cervera. 
Documentation to this effect is provided by the young 
comprised over 2,000 fighting men and women, not 
counting liaison agents on the plain. It is not easy to give a 
date for the cessation of guerrilla action but all the studies 
carried out confirm that the “three years of terror” − in 
the words of the historian Francisco Moreno − were those 
from 1947 to 1949. The recent biography of the Commu-
nist leader Heribert Quiñones, that of the Catalan resist-
ance fighter Marcel·lí Massana, “a myth of the anarchist 
guerrilla movement”, and the history of the anarchosyn-
dicalist Ramon Vila, ‘Caracremada’, a prototypical urban 
guerrilla fighter who was considered “the last Catalan re-
sistance fighter”, all seem to confirm this.16
War, Post-War Period, and Victims
Josep Benet, one of the first historians to calculate the cost 
of the Civil War and the Franco regime in human terms, 
expressed the view that Catalonia lost around 125,000 in-
habitants, counting military casualties, those executed by 
both sides, and those who went into exile. Today this fig-
ure seems very conservative. 
Benet’s definition of the victims, despite its broad span 
− for it includes losses due to the fighting, the two waves 
of repression, the penalties imposed in the post-war peri-
od, and exile − proves fairly operational, since it enables 
us to break down the figures and grasp the implications of 
the defeat. Out of a total population of 2,791,292, accord-
ing to the 1930 census, Catalonia lost approximately 
45,000 young people on the front or in hospitals, some 
5,000 in bombing raids, 8,500 as a result of rearguard re-
pression, and nearly 4,000 to Francoist repression during 
and after the war. To these must be added the approxi-
mately 2,000 Catalans sent to Spanish and Nazi prisons 
and concentration camps, deaths due to explosions and 
accidents caused by abandoned war materials – an esti-
mated 1‰ of the Catalan population −, deaths imputable 
to disease or starvation, and the loss to society of the 
50,000 to 70,000 Catalans who are currently estimated to 
have fled into permanent exile. 
It may be possible to reach more accurate estimates 
once the data gathered by the Catalan Generalitat since 
January 2003 as part of the project “Fosses comunes i per-
sones desaparegudes durant la guerra civil i el franquis-
me” (Mass graves and persons who disappeared during 
the Civil War and the Franco regime), which are still be-
ing compiled, are known. In the approximately 150 mass 
graves studied so far, some 9,000 persons were buried 
without identification, most of them soldiers who died on 
the battlefront. More precise data may also be yielded by 
the study “El Cost Humà de la Guerra Civil a Catalunya”, 
when it is completed. This project, originally launched by 
Josep Benet at the “Centre d’Història Contemporània de 
Catalunya” (CHCC) − an organization set up in 1984 of 
which he was the first director −, has now resumed.17
For the Valencian Country it is more difficult to make 
overall estimates. It has been calculated that 460 people 
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maintained nonetheless and, following the establishment 
in 1943 of the Servicio de Libertad Vigilada (Conditional 
Release Service), many paroled prisoners had to report 
periodically to the authorities. All these measures amount-
ed to an impregnable system of coercion, supported by a 
wide variety of techniques aimed at investigation, depura-
tion and chastisement. 
Political Responsibilities and Economic 
Repression 
Once Franco had been invested with full legislative power 
and the criminal code had been suspended pending ap-
proval of the revised code in 1944, a new legal framework 
was gradually built up within which special jurisdictions 
of different types proliferated. The aim of the latter was to 
complement the exceptional powers of the military tribu-
nals, which remained in force until the Tribunal de Orden 
Público (Public Order Tribunal) was set up in 1963. Three 
laws were of special importance: the Ley de Responsabili-
dades Políticas (Law of Political Responsibilities, 9 Febru-
ary 1939), the Ley de Represión de la Masonería y el 
Comunismo (Law for the Repression of the Masonry and 
historian Aram Monfort in a recent study of the concen-
tration camp in the Horta district and the various prisons 
that existed in Barcelona at the time. Among them were 
the Presó Model, on Carrer Numància, which was exten-
sively studied by Pelai Pagès some time ago, the convent 
of Sant Elies, in the district of Sant Gervasi, the Cànem 
prison, a former spinning mill in the Poble Nou district 
belonging to the Godó family, who also owned the news-
paper La Vanguardia Española, and the Palau de les Mis-
sions, a building designed by the architect Antoni Darder 
in 1929, which was part of the Montjuïc trade fair. Wom-
en were imprisoned in the building known as Casa dels 
Duran (Duran being the name of the former owners) and, 
prior to the Civil War, as Asil del Bon Consell. It was lo-
cated in the district of Les Corts, on the site where the de-
partment store, El Corte Inglés, was built in the 1970s. 
There was a military prison in Montjuïc castle as well, and 
several detention centres, including the basement of Ban-
ca Tusquets, at the corner of Plaça d’Urquinaona and Via 
Laietana, and the Jefatura de Policía (police headquar-
ters), which stood on the square now known as Plaça 
Francesc Macià. 
In the network of concentration camps and jails that 
covered the whole of Catalonia, overcrowding was ram-
pant and living conditions appalling, as many former 
prisoners recall. One, the socialist senator from Tarrago-
na, Josep Subirats Piñana, related the time he spent in the 
Pilatos prison in his own city, while Maria Salvo, through 
the historian Ricard Vinyes, gave an account of the im-
prisonment of militants from the Joventuts Socialistes 
(Young Socialists). The monthly figures for each province 
which were sent to the Servicio Nacional de Prisiones 
(National Prison Service) − subsequently to become a 
general directorate − enable us to calculate that the total 
number of detainees in Catalonia at the beginning of Jan-
uary 1940 was 27,309. In the Catalan capital alone there 
were 14,509, of whom 1,184 were women.19
These large numbers posed problems for the regime it-
self and soon steps were taken to remedy the congestion 
and take advantage of the labour of prison and camp in-
mates. A system whereby sentences could be commuted 
through work was introduced by the Jesuit José Agustín 
Pérez del Pulgar and the Servicio de Colonias Peniten- 
ciarias Militarizadas (Militarized Penal Colony Service), 
out of which a system of prison workshops developed. 
This new manpower, along with that of the numerous 
Batallones de Trabajadores (Workers’ Battalions) made 
up of previously classified soldiers from the Republican 
army, was all channelled into a forced labour system, the 
existence of which was concealed for many years. Once its 
repercussions were discovered, some commentators had 
no hesitation in describing it as “slave labour”.20
Most prisoners, moreover, suffered severely from be-
ing separated from family and friends. Release on parole, 
a measure introduced in 1940, and the pardons that were 
granted with some regularity from 1945 onwards, helped 
slightly to alleviate the hardship. Bans on residence were 
Figure 4. A bill of indictment on grounds of political responsabili-
ties against Humbert Torres, a leader of Joventut Republicana (Re-
publican Youth organization) and a former mayor of Lleida. 
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sus were prosecuted by the Tribunal of Political Respon-
sibilities. Much still remains to be discovered about the 
true extent of this tribunal’s activities. 
According to data for the whole of Spain, over 300,000 
proceedings had been instituted by 1944. Often, as with 
the war tribunals, there were several accused. Some 
125,000 verdicts were brought in between 1939 and 1941, 
approximately 10,000 in the province of Barcelona. Near-
ly 4,000 prosecutions were made in Lleida. All in all, 1% of 
the population was affected, though the consequences 
were multiplied by the fact that, in practice, the sanctions 
affected the entire family of the accused.21 
Analysis of the law reveals, among other things, nu-
merous violations of the principle of legality: its effects 
were made retroactive to 1934; deceased persons and 
minors could be held responsible, as could those who 
had disappeared or were absent and therefore unable to 
defend themselves; and the families of the accused in-
herited their guilt and could incur economic sanctions. 
Certain additional penalties, such as disqualification for 
particular offices or professions, or imprescriptible loss 
of nationality, even violated the Franco regime’s own 
laws. 
The members of these special tribunals were appointed 
by the government and drawn from the army, the magis-
tracy − purged of hostile elements − and the Falange (Fa-
lange Española Tradicionalista y de la JONS). Among the 
seventeen grounds for prosecution (article 4), one of the 
most important was previous conviction by a military 
court, in other words, a prior conviction for the same of-
fence. Owing to the criminal, penal nature of the law, a 
fine was obligatory, unless the accused was acquitted or a 
stay of proceedings was granted. Fines ranged from 100 
pesetas to the confiscation of all the accused’s assets. The 
restriction of professional activities and the limitation of 
freedom of residence could include a ban on exercising 
particular professions, various forms of banishment or, as 
mentioned above, loss of nationality. According to 
Manuel Alvaro Dueñas, the State expected this legislation 
to bring in 5% of the wealth of each province but in prac-
tice it proved impossible to execute the sentences. Thus in 
September 1941, 85% of the cases had not yet been tried 
or were awaiting a verdict. Urgent amendments were 
needed to make the law more effective. This was done in 
1942. In 1945 it was repealed, though a Comisión Liqui-
dadora de Responsabilidades Políticas (Commission for 
the Discharge of Political Responsibilities) remained in 
operation until the 1960s. 
The poverty of most of those charged does much to ex-
plain the inefficacy of this legislation which, like all re-
pressive measures, had a largely exemplary function. It 
was just one more element in the travesty of Franco’s jus-
tice, the aim of which, in effect, was to instil fear into the 
population by hunting down and punishing culprits. 
Even so, some sizeable fortunes were seized under the 
law, and it is these that have left the clearest traces in the 
historiography. As Francesc Vilanova’s thorough analysis 
Communism, 1 March 1940), and the Ley de Seguridad 
del Estado (Law of State Security, 29 March 1941).
The economic repression carried out under the Law of 
Political Responsibilities was conceived as a means where-
by the assets of the families of those punished could be 
used to pay for their guilt. This principle began to be reg-
ularly enforced in the course of the hostilities. The penal-
ties were also designed to finance the rebuilding of the 
country, its destruction being attributed to the acts of the 
defeated. In Catalonia the pattern was the same as in other 
areas of Spain that had come under Franco’s rule: the de-
spoliation of the vanquished began immediately after the 
occupation, in the spring of 1938. In occupied areas such 
as Majorca and Lleida, aside from irregular seizures of 
property, which also took place, the occupiers set up 
Comisiones Provinciales de Bienes Incautados (Provin-
cial Commissions of Confiscated Property) to seize the 
assets of parties, associations and individual opponents of 
the regime, notably if the latter had died or fled, as was 
fairly often the case. The documentation available shows 
that only 25% of those prosecuted had been located before 
being judged by the special regional tribunals set up un-
der a new law, which took over the functions of the origi-
nal commissions. It has been calculated that over 25,000 
of the 2,791,292 inhabitants of Catalonia listed in the cen-
Figure 5. Often the accused were put on trial in groups, as is shown 
by this indictment for political responsabilities brought in the Llei-
da region.
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brought, for instance, against the painters Joaquim Bal-
cells and Joaquim Mir, while Rafael Battestini, a Catalan 
nationalist doctor from Tarragona, was accused after he 
had already been shot, as Joan Mª Thomas has pointed 
out. Of special interest, because of the sentences handed 
down, are the cases of the architect Josep Lluís Sert and 
the musician Pau Casals, who was fined one million pese-
tas in 1940.
The Institutionalization of the Purge of 
Professional People
On 10 February 1939 the Ley de Depuración de Funcio-
narios Públicos (Law for the Depuration of Public Serv-
ants) came into force. It had irreversible consequences on 
professional people from a wide range of sectors. From 
this time onwards, civil servants were subject to a law that 
had been promulgated to guarantee their loyalty and sub-
mission. All government employees − from teachers to 
magistrates, via the lower echelons, such as postmen (ex-
haustively studied by Juan Carlos Bordes Muñoz in a doc-
toral thesis defended in 2003 at the Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia [UNED]) or prison employees 
− had to prove their innocence. When faced with the hu-
miliating experience of publicly renouncing past ideals 
and conduct, some prepared documents summarizing the 
evidence for the defence which, in the words of historian 
Francisco Morente, were “extraordinarily adroit”. He re-
reveals, prominent members of the Catalan bourgeoisie 
were investigated and accused of being lukewarm towards 
the new regime. Not even those who had worked for 
Franco’s cause escaped. For instance, the politicians Lluís 
Duran i Ventosa and Felip Rodés − the latter was a former 
minister of the Crown − were both denounced for their 
alleged loyalty to the Catalan nationalist cause. Proceed-
ings were also instituted against Agustín Calvet, ‘Gaziel’ 
− the journalist, editor and editorialist of La Vanguardia 
under the Second Republic, who was close to the entou-
rage of Franco’s minister Eduardo Aunós − and against 
his employer Carles Godó. Industrialists who were former 
members of the Lliga Regionalista (Regionalist League – a 
conservative Catalan nationalist party), such as the Ber-
trand Serra family or the Vilardell Permanyer brothers, 
were also prosecuted, while Regionalist leaders of the stat-
ure of Raimon d’Abadal i Caldero, Ramon d’Abadal i de 
Vinyals, Joaquim Balcells and Jesús Cambó Torras, a 
nephew of the politician Francesc Cambó, were investi-
gated on the grounds that they had been too slow in voic-
ing support for the regime.
Inevitably, all politicians associated with the Catalan 
autonomous government, the Generalitat, appeared be-
fore the special Tribunal of Political Responsibilities. 
The three children of the former Catalan President 
Francesc Macià were accused “because of who their fa-
ther was” and despite the fact that their father had died 
on Christmas Day 1933, outside the limit of retroactivity 
(1934) specified in the law itself. The brothers of Presi-
dent Lluís Companys were also prosecuted. The young-
est of the four, Camil Companys, was sentenced five 
months after his own tragic death in Montpellier (he 
committed suicide there on 20 September 1940, shortly 
after his brother Lluís was handed over by the Gestapo 
to Franco’s police). 
Other distinguished Republican citizens who were 
prosecuted included Eduard Ragasol, a property-owner 
from Caldes de Montbui who was the lawyer of Acció 
Catalana (Catalan Action, another conservative Catalan 
nationalist party), Joan Lluhí i Vallescà, and two men 
from Lleida, Josep Mª España i Sirat, a minister of the 
Generalitat, and Humbert Torres, a former mayor of the 
city. Charges were also laid against the Hurtado and Pi i 
Sunyer families and the Rubió i Tudurí brothers. Anoth-
er eminent citizen, Pere Coromines, saw his house in 
Sant Pol converted into the headquarters of the Falange, 
while the newspaper that belonged to the Rahola family 
of Girona was seized. Two former mayors of Barcelona, 
Carles Pi i Sunyer and Jaume Aiguader i Miró, were 
prosecuted, as were the vast majority of the Republicans 
who had been elected to the municipal councils of Cata-
lonia’s towns and villages, and workers and union lead-
ers from all over the country, though the latter, if they 
had not already fled the country, were first brought be-
fore the war tribunals. 
Intellectuals, artists and professional people were not 
immune from the effects of the legislation. Charges were 
Figure 6. The assets of the Macià family were valued by the Tribu-
nal of Political Responsabilities at close to 3 million pesetas. In 1942 
Joan Macià was sentenced to the confiscation of his property, Jose-
fina Macià was fined 50,000 pesetas, and Maria Macià was fined 
500,000 pesetas. In the case of Joan Macià, it was proved that he had 
no property because he had sold his rightful share in the inheri- 
tance to his sister Maria before going into exile in Mexico and a stay 
of proceedings was granted. Maria and Josefina, on the other hand, 
paid their fines, though the appeal they lodged was successful and 
the full amount was later reimbursed.
001-156 ANGLES.indd   141 14/04/09   09:41:30
142   Cat. Hist. Rev. 1, 2008 Conxita Mir
Mallorca: los inocentes de la guerra civil” (The shooting 
of the blameless in Majorca: the innocent victims of the 
Civil War).23 And indeed, as early as the summer of 1938, 
the tenuous link that always existed between guilt and pun-
ishment was apparent in the wave of repression unleashed 
in Majorca. From the very start, lists of people to be shot, 
drawn up by civilian supporters of the new regime, became 
a feature of Franco’s justice. This form of collaboration was 
especially rife in the countryside, where the effects of the 
violent repression were most extreme. This is shown by a 
wide variety of documents relating to charges and proceed-
ings through which the mechanisms underlying the insti-
tutionalization of the new order can be perceived. Under 
this new order, the efficacy of the violence is seen to be in-
extricably linked to the re-establishment of former net-
works of political domination and loyalty based on clien-
telism and caciquism, which the brief period of Republican 
democracy had not had time to neutralize. 
Denunciation, a method exalted from above, was a way 
of becoming actively involved in the repression, either 
voluntarily or under duress. The fact that reports from 
mayors, priests, civil guards and the leaders of the local 
Falange were a compulsory feature of the proceedings is 
clear proof of this. The same applied to charges for politi-
cal responsibilities or those to do with professional purg-
ing. These compulsory reports clearly illustrate to what 
extent, in repressive practice, the judgement preceded the 
crime. Agreement was reached in advance over the offi-
cial reports, testimony and statements to be submitted to 
the appropriate judicial authority and there is no percep-
tible discrepancy between the different authorities or in-
stitutions called upon to express an opinion about the ac-
cused. This system, in effect, relied on fear, which was 
all-pervasive, and on the caution exercised by those who 
had already joined, or aspired to join, the new power 
block, as also happened in other European dictatorships 
where similar methods of repression and social control 
were used.
Charges brought against members of the lower classes, 
who lacked individual and material resources and influ-
ential friends to appeal to, were the most numerous and 
also the ones in which the true nature of Francoist legality 
− predominated by the absence of general norms, arbi-
trariness and impunity − are most faithfully reflected. 
This does not mean, however, that eminent personalities 
were spared. A prime example was the trial of the Catalan 
President Lluís Companys before the war tribunal.24 Oth-
ers were the trials of Carles Rahola − studied by Josep 
Benet −, that of CNT leader Joan Peiró − analysed by Al-
bert Balcells −, and that of the members of the Barcelona 
Civil Guard − studied by Manuel Risques −. In each case, 
the proceedings explicitly confirm the aleatory nature of 
the judicial actions and the absence of the presumption of 
innocence. Moreover, as we observe the situation that 
gradually evolved, we are prompted to take account of the 
repercussions, in a society under surveillance, of other 
mechanisms of repression and control which, though less 
lates, for instance, how a student from the teacher train-
ing college in Valencia defended himself against a charge 
of “Leftism” with “a long and erudite string of quotations 
from Franco and José Antonio (!)”. His skilful defence 
won praise from the purge commission itself. 
Teachers were persecuted with special ferocity, espe-
cially if they were thought to have assimilated liberal and 
democratic ideals such as those imparted at the Catalan 
Generalitat’s teacher training college. The research car-
ried out by Francisco Morente, and that of Solomó Mar-
quès, who studied the collective prestige of teachers in 
exile in Mexico and Venezuela, reveals that one of every 
six Catalan teachers was permanently banned from the 
profession, while others were transferred elsewhere or 
temporarily suspended without pay. The numbers in-
crease even more if we take into account the fifty govern-
ment-run secondary schools that were handed over to re-
ligious orders, who thus recovered their monopoly over 
secondary education. Over four hundred teachers fled the 
country, becoming victims of a defeat that was to have an 
overwhelming impact on education and culture. This has 
been clearly illustrated by Jaume Claret in a study of 
academia, a group located at the apex of the broad pyra-
mid of workers who suffered the consequences of the new 
regime’s policy of exclusion. 
In Catalonia at least 135 university professors were 
purged. Today they are commemorated by a memorial set 
up in 2001 in the courtyard at the Ciutadella campus of 
the Universitat Pompeu Fabra. It bears the names of the 
122 teaching staff known to have been purged at the time 
it was erected. Pompeu Fabra, after whom the university 
is named, had been chairman of the board of trustees of 
the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, founded in 1933 
by the government of the Republic. He himself was purged 
and indicted on various counts at the end of the war. An-
other name is that of Pere Bosch i Gimpera, a professor of 
prehistory who became chancellor of the University of 
Barcelona (1933) and Catalan minister of justice (1937-
1939). He went into exile first in Oxford and then in Co-
lombia before settling in Mexico and refused all invita-
tions to return to Spain. The professor of philosophy 
Joaquim Xirau i Palau also went into exile with his broth-
er Josep, a professor of criminal law, who was killed in an 
accident in Mexico in 1946. Other scientists and scholars 
who were purged included 71 professors of medicine, 
among them August Pi i Sunyer and Jesús M. Bellido. The 
memoirs which many of them left behind contain vivid 
recollections of this repression, which stifled any voice 
that might have challenged a new form of higher educa-
tion “..redeemed from Marxism and incorporated into 
Nationalist Spain”.22
Punishments and Crimes
An article dedicated by Xavier Lacosta to the Francoist re-
pression in Majorca bears the title “Fusilados sin culpa en 
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food, clothing, bicycles, electricity and professional tools 
of all kinds. These small lapses into minor delinquency 
were accompanied by offences to do with rationing, quo-
tas and taxes to regulate the distribution of scarce prod-
ucts of basic necessity. Many of these cases associated 
with the exceptional circumstances of the period were 
handled by the ordinary courts or the civil governors. The 
same applied to the suicides attributed in the reports of 
the Civil Guard to “the fear of being judged”, complaints 
which dared to mention the purchase of guarantors’ sig-
natures, and cases involving working prisoners who es-
caped or failed to carry out their sentences, all of which 
point to a few of the weak points the regime was unable to 
eliminate. 
When investigating the actions of the judicial and gov-
ernmental authorities, one also find clear cases in which 
sexual favours were obtained under coercion from wom-
en and girls with Republican pasts. This type of violence 
was more serious than the humiliating and exemplifying 
practices also inflicted on many men, such as swallowing 
castor oil or having their heads shaved; it also escaped the 
consequences of the control of social morality which was 
enforced with wholehearted cooperation from the 
Church. Attitudes towards certain forms of behaviour 
that came under the criminal code from 1944 onwards − 
including abortion, desertion of the family, infanticide, 
and other acts with obvious sexual connotations, such as 
indecent assault and rape − cast light on the way women, 
in questions of morality, became the main victims to be 
punished. The same double standard made it possible for 
illegal prostitution − closely associated with the hardship 
and poverty endured by so many women who had been 
left alone with no means of support in the difficult post-
war years − to coexist alongside a legal, regulated form of 
prostitution, at least until 1956. 
The regime set up organizations to protect the many 
women and girls who had been left alone by the war, no-
tably the Patronato de Protección de la Mujer (Women’s 
Protection Board). However the efficacy of such organi-
zations leaves room for doubt in view of the number of 
young maidservants tried for prostitution, loose-living or 
immoral practices, when in fact they had been sexually as-
saulted and abused. Offences of the latter type were all too 
often considered mere scandalous misdemeanours that 
were harmful to public morality, the latter being the prime 
objective the regime sought to defend. 
The situation of women takes on especially dramatic 
overtones if one considers the fate of women prisoners. 
Ricard Vinyes, in Irredentas. Las presas políticas y sus hi-
jos en las cárceles franquistas (Temas de Hoy, 2002),27 de-
scribes how many women were imprisoned along with 
their children. Many children were born in prison and 
subsequently offered in adoption. Other indirect victims 
of repression were the children placed in the care of insti-
tutions such as the Auxilio Social (Social Assistance), a 
prototypical institutionalized charity which consistently 
enjoyed the protection of National Catholicism. Orphans 
obvious, are equally important when it comes to deter-
mining to what extent, and in what way, the country that 
had just emerged from a destructive war was rebuilt un-
der the dictatorship. 
Pacification and Reconstruction 
Lleida was the first major Catalan city to discover what 
taking possession of conquered territory meant to the 
occupiers. General Yagüe’s troops entered the city on 3 
April 1938. Two days later, pacification got underway 
with the first official act: the repeal, by the government in 
Burgos, of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. Ten days af-
ter the city was occupied, the first civil governor, Lluís G. 
Ventalló i Vergés, addressed the citizens of Lleida in a 
proclamation which referred to the “separatist yoke” and 
“the crime of separatism”, and finished up with “Long 
live Spanish Lérida!”, preceded by “¡Arriba España!” and 
followed by “¡Viva el Generalísimo Franco!”. Thus, in the 
midst of a serious moral and economic crisis, the repres-
sion of the Catalan language and culture commenced. 
The consequences of this repression were analysed by 
Josep Benet in a book with a highly explicit title: L’intent 
franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya (Barce-
lona, 1995) (The Francoist attempt at cultural genocide 
against Catalonia). Almost a year before the war ended, 
the regions around Lleida and Tarragona began to feel 
the effects of the judicial and administrative machinery 
at the service of the new regime. Starting on Christmas 
Eve 1938, when the final offensive was launched, the 
whole of Catalonia came under this same system. During 
the long post-war period, which began in early February 
1939, to the death toll caused by the most bloody form of 
repression were added the victims of the control to which 
all aspects of everyday life were subjected, and those of 
what has been termed ‘repression by contempt’, which is 
so difficult to pin down.
The small island of Minorca, which remained loyal to 
the Republic to the end, offers a highly enlightening ex-
ample. There were a total of 150 deaths, mostly executions 
carried out in 1939. However, several recent studies show 
that this figure doubles if the deaths ascribable to the 
shortages suffered by the most needy in the course of the 
post-war recovery are taken into consideration.25 
Everywhere corruption and extortion, securely shield-
ed by the coercive system itself, impeded the rebuilding of 
everyday life, while the dozens of prosecutions handled 
by the new government authorities or the ordinary courts 
of justice illustrate the vulnerable situation in which nu-
merous marginal groups belonging to the popular classes 
remained for years.26 
Crimes against property rose to over 50% of the cases 
brought to trial in the civil courts − the figure considered 
usual in normal times −, a sign that the problem of sur-
vival was driving people to extremes. A significant number 
were reduced to stealing small but essential items, such as 
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quired to gain a better understanding of the defeat and 
the suffering it caused. 
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[5] J. A. Martín Pallín gives the following definition 
in “La memoria del golpe militar de 1936” in Claves 
de Razón Práctica, No. 174, July-August 2007, 
pp. 42-45: “A bando militar (military decree) is an 
order issued by a general in command or military 
authority in the field or in a state of war against 
which no previous law can be invoked as being still 
in force”. 
[6] We owe the first analysis to the doctoral thesis of 
Josep M. Solé i Sabaté. La repressió franquista a 
Catalunya, 1938-1953. Edicions 62, Barcelona 1985, 
which has recently been republished (September 
2003) with minor revisions. Solé i Sabaté was also 
the editor of “La repressió franquista (1938-1977)”. 
and children whose parents were in prison were scattered 
about in special schools, centres and charitable institu-
tions all over the country. Most of those in Barcelona were 
sent to the Asilo de Reforma Toribio Duran; those in Tar-
ragona to the Casa Tutelar de San José; while in Lleida 
strange agricultural camps for children were set up, one 
of which was at Gimenells, near Lleida city. 
Thus the construction of the new regime took place 
in a subjugated, terrorized country, where there was no 
room for political opposition of any kind because wi- 
despread poverty engendered submission. Ismael Saz 
and J.A. Gómez Roda, in their study El Franquismo en 
Valencia. Formas de vida y actitudes sociales en la pos- 
gue rra (Episteme, 1999), illustrate this clearly and reflect 
on the relationship between consent and passivity. When 
all is said and done, the fact that people sometimes ac-
cepted minor sinecures from the government is best ex-
plained by the hardship suffered by the lower classes. 
Graft became part of the very foundations of the sys-
tem: the regulation of the economy and the administra-
tion of public affairs helped irregularities to become the 
rule in questions related to survival under a regime in 
which the notion of compassion for the vanquished was 
non-existent. 
Not until 1952, after two decades of autarchy and isola-
tion, were ration cards abolished. In the following year 
Spain signed a military treaty with the United States and 
in 1955 it entered the United Nations. One year later, in 
1956, the PCE launched its so-called Policy of National 
Reconciliation, under which it solemnly declared its read-
iness to put an end to the divisions created by the Civil 
War. Certainly many things had changed in the preced-
ing twenty years, though for those on the losing side eve-
ryday life was still fraught with difficulties. Meanwhile the 
wounds inflicted by the war and the revolution, and deep-
ened to an unusual degree by the regime’s repressive 
measures, remained unhealed, and this delayed the rec-
onciliation which, though possible, had few opportunities 
to express itself. 
Today the survivors and the relatives of those who 
disappeared as a result of Francoist repression – those 
described as rebels, bandits or simply murderers in the 
sentences handed down by a judicial system that was a 
farce − are still awaiting reparation, albeit in moral form. 
Others believe it may even be possible to recover their 
relatives’ remains and give them a decent burial. Restor-
ing to the losers of the war the memory that was demon-
strably stolen from them is both a necessary and an un-
questionably complex process, though in fact it is merely 
a matter of acknowledging and making public the things 
that historians have been investigating, discovering and 
gathering into history books aimed at the academic 
community rather than the general public. Probably for 
this very reason many ordinary people have felt the de-
sire in recent years to write down their experiences and 
testify to their own recollections. All these individual 
histories add their contribution to the efforts still re-
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Països Catalans, IX. Enciclopèdia Catalana, Barcelo-
na 1999; the events in Lleida in M. Gimeno, Revolu-
ció, guerra i repressió al Pallars, 1936-1939. Publica-
cions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1987. 
[12] The data on Francoist repression are in Mercè Ba-
rallat. La repressió a la postguerra civil a Lleida 
(1938-1945). Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montse r- 
rat, Barcelona 1991; those on the initial phases of 
the occupation are in Joan Sagués. Una ciutat en 
guerra. Lleida en la guerra civil espanyola, 1936-
1939. Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Bar-
celona 2003. The names of the victims are listed on 
the following web sites: “Morts de la guerra civil al 
cementiri d’Alpicat”, <http://www.alpicat.cat/ 
historiaguerracivil/>, and “Morts de la guerra civil i la 
repressió franquista a Lleida”, <http://webserveis5.
udl.es/gcivil/>. Both were created as part of the Pi-
lot Plan for the Lleida region, under the terms of a 
collaboration agreement with Memorial Democrà- 
tic de Catalunya (first phase 2005-06).
[13] Vicent Gavarda. Els afusellaments al País Valen-
cià (1938-1956). Alfons el Magnànim, Valencia 
1993. Also M. Ors. La represión de guerra y de pos-
guerra en Alicante (1936-1945). Institut Gil-Albert, 
Alacant 1995. A good summary of the period, the 
background to the end of the war, and the post-war 
period can be found in I. Saz. “República, guerra i 
franquisme”. Història del país Valencià, Volume V, 
Època Contemporània. Edicions 62, Barcelona 
1990, pp. 287-353.
[14] On 24 November 2007 the press reported that a 
court of the Valencian Autonomous Community 
(the Sala del Contenciós Administratiu of the Tri-
bunal Superior de Justícia) had decided to accept an 
appeal from the Council against an earlier ruling in 
favour of the organization Fòrum per la Memòria 
Històrica del País Valencià, which had succeeded in 
halting the development work pending investiga-
tion of the remains in the cemetery extension. The 
court based its decision on the argument that 
Fòrum per la Memòria cannot represent the indi-
vidual rights of the victims, since only direct rela-
tives can do that. This ignores the fact that the ma-
jority of the relatives have left the area or do not 
know where their forebears were buried. See El País, 
24 November 2007 and, for discussion on the topic: 
<http://www.foroporlamemoria.info/>. 
[15] As related by Joan Villarroya. “Passar comptes” 
in Borja de Riquer, Història, Política, Societat i Cul-
tura dels Països Catalans, Volume 10, La llarga post-
guerra 1939-1960. Fundació Enciclopèdia Catalana, 
Barcelona 1997, pp. 158-162. 
[16] The biographies referred to are: D. Guinard. Heri-
berto Quiñones y el movimiento comunista en Es-
paña (1931-1942). Palma-Madrid 2000, Josep 
Clara. Ramon Vila, Caracremada, el darrer maqui 
català. Rafael Dalmau Editor, Barcelona 2002, and 
El franquisme a Catalunya, Volume V. Edicions 62, 
Barcelona 2007. 
[7] Certain local histories are of invaluable assistance 
in describing the repressive violence of those years. 
Examples are: J. March, A. Cerdà, P. Salas. Po-
llença. La guerra civil a Pollença. La revolta contra 
la rebel·lió. Edicions Documenta Balear, Col·lecció 
Guerra Civil a Mallorca, 2006, and, in the same se-
ries, the account mentioned in the text: Bartomeu 
Garí. Porreres. Desfilades de dia, afusellaments de 
nit, Majorca 2007.
[8] Our prime sources are: Josep Massot i Muntaner. 
El primer franquisme a Mallorca. Guerra civil, re-
pressió, exili i represa cultural. Publicacions de 
l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1996; Georges 
Bernanos i la Guerra Civil. Publicacions de l’Abadia 
de Montserrat, Barcelona 1989; Guerra civil i re-
pressió a Mallorca. Publicacions de l’Abadia de 
Montserrat, Barcelona 1997 and El desembarca-
ment de Bayo a Mallorca. Juliol-setembre de 1936. 
Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 
1987. On the repression in the other islands: F. Ber-
tazioli Riquer. Memorias de la guerra y del exilio. 
Memorias de la Guerra Civil en Ibiza durante mi in-
fancia y del posterior exilio con mi familia. Eivissa, 
Mediterrània-Eivissa 1996. A. Adrover, J. Ca- 
bot. Felanitx 1931-1939. República, Guerra i repres-
sió. Sant Jordi de ses Salines, Eivissa 2002. Artur 
Pa rron. La guerra civil a Eivissa i Formentera (1936-
1939. Edicions Documenta Balear, Palma de Ma-
llorca 2000; and La guerra civil i el primer franquis-
me a Eivissa i Formentera. Eivissa, 2001.
[9] The controversy over the figures can be followed in 
the book by Ll. Capella. Diccionari vermell. Moll, 
Palma de Mallorca 1989, and also in J. Massot i 
Muntaner. Georges Bernanos i la Guerra Civil. op. 
cit., and in the synthesis drawn up by D. Ginard. 
“Resistència i repressió a les Balears (1939-1963)”, 
in the exhibition catalogue Memòria de la Democ-
ràcia, 1936-1962. Govern de les Illes Balears, Con-
sell de Mallorca, 2003.
[10] The association commenced its activities in the 
mid-1980s. Finally, in the spring of 2006, the sign-
posting and ‘dignification’ of the area commenced 
at the instigation of Memorial Democràtic, an insti-
tution set up by the Generalitat de Catalunya, on 
the basis of a project entitled “Espais de la Batalla 
del Segre”, with coordination from the Servei 
d’Història, Documentació i Patrimoni of the His-
tory Department at the University of Lleida. This 
latter service has also produced a DVD, “Un camp 
de batalla de la guerra civil al front del Segre. El 
Merengue i la Lleva del Biberó (1938)”, as part of 
the series Llocs de memòria amb història. Universi-
tat de Lleida, 2006. 
[11] The events in Majorca are described in Hilari Ra-
guer (Ed.). Història, política, societat i cultura dels 
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concentració d’Horta i les presons de la ciutat. Doc-
toral thesis (forthcoming), defended at the Univer-
sitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2007.
[20] Situations such as those outlined here explain why 
the forecasts made by the Generalitat de Catalunya 
in 2000, when compensation to persons not cov-
ered by the Law of Amnesty 46/1977 (15 October 
1977) was regulated, have proved totally insuffi-
cient. Instead of the anticipated 2,000 claims, 38,000 
have been received to date, most of them from sol-
diers who were interned in concentration camps. 
[21] The most exhaustive study is the one by M. Álvaro 
Dueñas. “Por ministerio de la ley y voluntad del 
Caudillo”. La Jurisdicción Especial de Responsabili-
dades Políticas (1939-1945). Centro de Estudios 
Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid 2006. We owe 
the first study of the operation of these special tri-
bunals in the Catalan Countries to G. Sánchez Re-
cio. Las responsabilidades políticas en la postguerra 
española. El partido judicial de Monóvar. Universi-
tat d’Alacant, 1984. A monograph on the province 
of Lleida has been published by C. Mir Curcó, F. 
Corretgé, J. Farré i Sagués. Repressió econòmica 
i Franquisme: l’actuació del Tribunal de Responsa-
bilitats Polítiques a la província de Lleida. Publica-
cions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1997. 
Others who have studied the topic include: F. Vi-
lanova i Vila-Abadal. Repressió política i coacció 
econòmica. Les responsabilitats polítiques de repub-
licans i conservadors catalans a la postguerra (1939-
1942). Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 
Barcelona 1999, and M. Duran Pastor. Responsa-
bilidades políticas e incautación de bienes. Secuelas 
del desembarco de Bayo en Mallorca, 1936-1939. 
Palma de Mallorca 1995. 
[22] The information has been taken from the first syn-
thesis for the whole of Spain which was produced by 
F. Morente Valero. La escuela y el Estado Nuevo. 
La depuración del Magisterio Nacional, 1936-1943. 
Ámbito Ediciones, Valladolid 1997, p. 290. Studies 
of Catalan teachers who suffered reprisals include 
Josep González-Agàpito; Salomó Marquès. La 
repressió del professorat a Catalunya sota el franquis-
me, 1939-1943. Institut d’Estudis Catalans, Barcelo-
na 1996. With regard to higher education, we re-
ferred to Jaume Claret. El atroz desmoche. La 
destrucción de la universidad española por el fran-
quismo, 1936-1945. Crítica, Barcelona 2006. 
[23] <http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Colabora/ 
Lacosta2.htm>
[24] In 2004 the Generalitat de Catalunya published a 
facsimile edition entitled Consell de guerra i con-
demna a mort de Lluís Companys, President de la 
Generalitat de Catalunya (octubre de 1940).
[25] The data come from J. Martín Jiménez. Aporta-
ciones a la historia de la guerra civil en Menorca. 
Ediones Nura, Minorca 2000, 2 volumes; the source 
Josep Clara. Marcel.lí Massana. L’home més bus-
cat. Un mite de la guerrilla anarquist. Rafael Dal-
mau editor, Barcelona 2005.
[17] The figures were updated to reflect the increase at 
the end of the 1990s, as reported in Josep Benet. 
“1939: any zero”. Història, Política, Societat i Cul-
tura dels Països Catalans, Fundació Enciclopèdia 
Catalana, Barcelona 1997, pp. 68-72. See also: J. Oli-
va i Llorens. “El cost humà de la Guerra Civil de 
1936-1939: els combatents morts”. Recerques, No. 
30, 1994, pp. 87-102, and “Les víctimes dels bom-
bardeigs” in J. M. Solé i Sabaté, J. Villarroya. 
Catalunya sota les bombes (1936-1939). Publica-
cions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Barcelona 1986. 
There are believed to have been 2,500 casualties in 
the city of Barcelona alone. In the city of Lleida, 
Mercè Barallat has documented 253 of the total of 
over 300 victims of the bombing raid on 2 Novem-
ber 1937, of whom approximately fifty were chil-
dren from the Liceu Escolar. Most of the 400 dead 
attributed to the 1938 bombardments have not been 
identified. 
[18] The cataloguing is being carried out with technical 
coordination from the Arxiu Nacional de Catalu-
nya and the support of the Programa per a la Memòria 
Democràtica. Only when the data base is complete 
will it be possible to locate proceedings correspond-
ing to particular groups. This cannot be done at 
present because the charges against several people, 
which are very numerous, were filed under the first 
name in the list, and the only way of knowing the 
names of the other accused and where they were 
from is by examining each dossier. 
[19] This topic is dealt with in various papers published 
in the acts of the conference edited by J. Sobrequés, 
C. Molinero, M. Sal. Els camps de concentració i 
el món penitenciari a España durant la guerra civil 
i el franquisme. Museu d’Història de Catalunya, 
Crítica, Barcelona 2003. Just prior to this, at the in-
stigation of the Associació d’Expresos Polítics de 
Catalunya, an interesting book, full of the testimo-
ny of former political prisoners, was published un-
der the title Notícia de la negra nit. Vides i veus a les 
presons franquistes (1939-1959). Diputació de Bar-
celona, Barcelona 2001. The works mentioned are: 
P. Pagès. La presó Model de Barcelona. Història 
d’un centre penitenciari en temps de guerra (1936-
1939). Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, Bar-
celona 1996. J. Subirats Piñana. Pilatos 1939-
1941. Prisión de Tarragona. Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 
Madrid 1993. R. Vinyes. El daño y la memoria. Las 
prisiones de Maria Salvo. Plaza & Janés, Barcelona 
2004. The following web site is of great interest: Me-
moria de les Corts. Prisión de las mujeres. Barcelona, 
1939-1945: <http://www.presodelescorts.org/es/
taxonomy/term/32>. Also, Aram Monfort. Barce-
lona 1939: ocupació i repressió militar. El camp de 
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ticia, orden y marginación en la Catalunya rural de 
posguerra. Milenio, Lleida 2000, first part, “La so-
ciedad intervenida, justicia civil y control social”, 
pp. 31-189.
[27] The author acted as adviser to the documentary Els 
nens perduts del franquisme (The lost children of 
the Franco regime) by Montse Armengou and 
Ricard Belis, 2002, Televisió de Catalunya, one of 
the most successful television documentaries in 
terms of viewer ratings. 
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